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Abstract: Government agencies faced with politically controversial decisions often discount or ignore scien-
tific information, whether from agency staff or nongovernmental scientists. Recent developments in scientific
integrity (the ability to perform, use, communicate, and publish science free from censorship or political
interference) in Canada, Australia, and the United States demonstrate a similar trajectory. A perceived
increase in scientific-integrity abuses provokes concerted pressure by the scientific community, leading to
efforts to improve scientific-integrity protections under a new administration. However, protections are often
inconsistently applied and are at risk of reversal under administrations publicly hostile to evidence-based
policy. We compared recent challenges to scientific integrity to determine what aspects of scientific input into
conservation policy are most at risk of political distortion and what can be done to strengthen safeguards
against such abuses. To ensure the integrity of outbound communications from government scientists to the
public, we suggest governments strengthen scientific integrity policies, include scientists’ right to speak freely
in collective-bargaining agreements, guarantee public access to scientific information, and strengthen agency
culture supporting scientific integrity. To ensure the transparency and integrity with which information from
nongovernmental scientists (e.g., submitted comments or formal policy reviews) informs the policy process,
we suggest governments broaden the scope of independent reviews, ensure greater diversity of expert input
and transparency regarding conflicts of interest, require a substantive response to input from agencies, and
engage proactively with scientific societies. For their part, scientists and scientific societies have a responsibility
to engage with the public to affirm that science is a crucial resource for developing evidence-based policy and
regulations in the public interest.
Keywords: endangered species act, external peer review, science communication, scientific advocacy
En Defensa de la Integridad Cient´ıfica de los Procesos de Pol´ıtica de Conservacio´n
Resumen: Las agencias del gobierno que enfrentan decisiones pol´ıticas controversiales comu´nmente rebajan
o ignoran la informacio´n cient´ıfica, ya sea de empleados de la agencia o cient´ıficos no-gubernamentales. Los
desarrollos recientes en la integridad cient´ıfica (la capacidad de desempen˜ar, usar, comunicar, y publicar
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ciencia libre de censura o interferencia pol´ıtica) en Canada´, Australia y en los Estados Unidos demuestran
una trayectoria similar. Un incremento percibido en los abusos a la integridad cient´ıfica provoca presiones
conjuntas por la comunidad cient´ıfica, lo que lleva a esfuerzos por mejorar las protecciones de la integridad
cient´ıfica bajo una nueva administracio´n. Sin embargo, las protecciones se aplican continuamente sin con-
sistencia y esta´n en riesgo de una regresio´n bajo administraciones pu´blicamente hostiles a la pol´ıtica basada
en evidencias. Comparamos los retos recientes para la integridad cient´ıfica para determinar cua´les aspectos
de la contribucio´n cient´ıfica a la pol´ıtica de conservacio´n esta´n en mayor riesgo de una distorsio´n pol´ıtica y
que´ puede hacerse para fortalecer los salvoconductos contra dichos abusos. Para asegurar la integridad de
las comunicaciones salientes de los cient´ıficos del gobierno al pu´blico sugerimos que los gobiernos fortalezcan
las pol´ıticas de integridad cient´ıfica, incluyan el derecho a hablar libremente de los cient´ıficos en los acuerdos
de negociaciones colectivas, garanticen el acceso del pu´blico a la informacio´n cient´ıfica, y que fortalezcan
la cultura de la agencia apoyando a la integridad cient´ıfica. Para asegurar la transparencia y la integridad
con la cual la informacio´n de los cient´ıficos no-gubernamentales (por ejemplo, los comentarios entregados
o las revisiones de pol´ıtica formal) informa los procesos pol´ıticos sugerimos que los gobiernos ampl´ıen el
enfoque de las revisiones independientes, aseguren una mayor diversidad de contribuciones de expertos y
transparencia con respecto a los conflictos de intere´s, requieran una respuesta sustanciosa a la contribucio´n
de las agencias, y que participen demanera proactiva con las sociedades cient´ıficas. Por su parte, los cient´ıficos
y las sociedades cient´ıficas tienen la responsabilidad de comprometerse con el pu´blico para afirmar que la
ciencia es un recurso crucial para desarrollar las pol´ıticas basadas en evidencias y las regulaciones en el
intere´s pu´blico.
Palabras Clave: ciencia, comunicacio´n, defensa cient´ıfica, ley de especies en peligro, revisio´n de colegas
externos
Introduction
Effective conservation outcomes depend in part on the
degree to which policy and management strategies are
supported by scientific evidence (Sutherland et al. 2004).
However, government agencies faced with politically
controversial decisions often discount or ignore scientific
information received from agency staff or nongovern-
mental scientists. We compared recent challenges to sci-
entific integrity in conservation policy making in Canada,
Australia, and theUnited States to determinewhat aspects
of scientific input into policy are most at risk of political
distortion and what can be done to strengthen safeguards
against such abuses.
We defined scientific integrity as the ability to per-
form, use, communicate, and publish science free from
censorship or political interference (Goldman et al.
2017). This definition encompasses the ability of gov-
ernment scientists to speak freely about their research
and the transparency and integrity with which infor-
mation from nongovernmental scientists (e.g., consulta-
tions, submitted comments, or formal policy reviews)
informs the policy process.
Although scientific integrity abuses arise under all po-
litical parties, they are accentuated under administrations
that publicly question the value of science and the validity
of widely accepted scientific knowledge (Goldman et al.
2017). The 2016 election of Donald Trump as U.S. pres-
ident alarmed much of the scientific community given
his administration’s attempts to silence government sci-
entists from speaking with the media and his rhetoric
disparaging accepted scientific concepts, including cli-
mate change (Ritchie et al 2017).
Recent developments in the United States are remi-
niscent of issues that arose when political appointees of
GeorgeW. Bush (2001–2009) prevented federal scientists
from publicly sharing their research and manipulated sci-
entific reports to justify policy decisions (Doremus 2008).
Similar violations occurred in Canada in the latter years
of the Harper administration (2011–2015), when federal
scientists were systematically prevented from communi-
cating their work to the public (Noe¨l 2016). Scientific in-
tegrity became a key issue in Canada’s 2015 election and
contributed to the election of a prime minister publicly
committed to strengthening scientific integrity. In Aus-
tralia, scientific-integrity violations became a prominent
political issue under the Howard administration (1996–
2007) (Khan 2017). When the opposition Labor party
took power in 2007, it publicly endorsed the right of
government scientists to speak freely about their work
(Price 2009).
Canada, Australia, and the United States are all exam-
ples of developed economies with common-law systems.
Although this is only one of many socioeconomic con-
texts for conservation, comparison of these 3 nations
illustrates the challenges to scientific integrity that arise
when a longstanding legal and societal commitment to
conservation confronts a perceived tension between con-
servation and economic activities. The 3 nations demon-
strate a similar trajectory concerning scientific integrity: a
perceived increase in abuses precipitates concerted pres-
sure by the scientific community followed by efforts to
improve institutionalization of scientific-integrity protec-
tions under a new administration. However, continued
violations and inconsistent application of new policies
remain even as those administrations publicly endorsed
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Table 1. Types of policy reform discussed in this review for strengthening the scientific integrity of 2 categories of scientific communication.
Communication type Suggested reform
Outbound communication from
government scientists to public
1. Strengthen scientific integrity policies
2. Include scientists’ right to speak freely in collective bargaining agreements
3. Guarantee public access to scientific information
4. Strengthen agency culture supporting scientific integrity
Inbound communication from
independent scientists to
government policy processes
5. Broaden the scope of independent reviews
6. Ensure greater diversity of input with transparency regarding conflicts of interest
7. Require substantive response to input by agencies
8. Engage proactively with scientific societies and organizations
reforms (Goldman et al. 2015; Ritchie et al. 2017). With
the recent advent of a U.S. administration more publicly
hostile to science than previous administrations, even in-
consistently applied reforms appear vulnerable to abroga-
tion through regulatory changes designed to undermine
the role of science in policy (Goldman et al. 2017).
We took a step back from recent crises to identify
problems that transcend administrations and geography
and examined how institutional safeguards of scientific
integrity can be made more robust. Although it may seem
impractical to propose strengthening scientific-integrity
policies under unsympathetic administrations, we be-
lieve a defense of existing protections must be coupled
with a focus on necessary improvements to ensure long-
term success in institutionalizing a culture of scientific
integrity in conservation-policy processes.
We built on other recent reviews of emerging
scientific-integrity issues (e.g., Goldman et al. 2017) by fo-
cusing specifically on how science informs conservation
policy. We examined commonalities and contrasts across
the 3 nations to determine which reforms are limited
to specific contexts and which are broadly relevant. We
considered reforms that address distinct threats to 2 types
of communication related to scientific integrity (Table 1).
First, outbound scientific communications from govern-
ment scientists to the public and media are threatened by
restrictive policies that limit scientists’ latitude to publish
or publicize their research findings. Public access to web-
sites or other sources of government scientific data have
also been curtailed in some instances. These limitations
on the free flow of information from government scien-
tists to the public undermine the ability of citizens to be
informed about and involved in debate on science-based
policy questions.
Second, politicians have sought to restrict or ignore
inbound scientific communication through which non-
governmental scientists inform policy. Although science
is only one source of influence on policy, democratic
processes are undermined when policy makers conceal
how and to what extent decisions are based on science.
Lawmakers in the United States have included in envi-
ronmental statutes formal opportunities for nongovern-
mental scientists to inform the policy-making process via
peer review of draft decisions. In Australia, such opportu-
nities arise primarily via informal consultation or material
submitted during the public-comment period.
Censorship in Communication between
Government Scientists and the Public
When government scientists conduct research, the policy
implications of their results are often unpredictable. Sci-
entific integrity requires not only a rigorous and unbiased
research process, but also the ability of scientists to speak
openly about their findings. In surveys of scientists across
8 U.S. federal agencies in 2005–2007, 60% of respondents
reported incidents of political interference in their work,
and 7% reported they had been directed to “provide in-
complete, inaccurate, or misleading information” to the
public (Goldman et al. 2017).
In a 2013 survey of Canadian government scientists,
25% reported being asked to exclude or alter informa-
tion for nonscientific reasons (Professional Institute of
the Public Service of Canada 2013). Under the Harper ad-
ministration, government scientists communicating their
work through the media faced lengthy approval pro-
cesses. Media minders often sat in on scientist’s inter-
views and even followed scientists at conferences to
discourage spontaneous commentary. These restrictions
stimulated sustained public protests by Canadian scien-
tists (Noe¨l 2016).
In Australia, even after the advent in 2007 of a new ad-
ministration’s public commitment to scientific integrity,
authorization was still often required (and sometimes de-
nied) before government researchers could speak pub-
licly about their research (Ritchie et al. 2017). Com-
missioned research was routinely subject to contractual
clauses allowing governments to prohibit publication of
research or modify language in scientific papers (Kypri
2015). Recently, news of the rediscovery of a plant
species thought to be extinct for 200 years (Hibbertia
fumana) was reportedly suppressed by the New South
Wales Office of Environment and Heritage until after a
development at the site where the plants were found
was approved (Hannam 2017) (Fig. 1). At the federal
level, the Australian government successfully requested
that the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Orga-
nization remove mention of the climate-change threats
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Figure 1. Species that provide examples of challenges to the scientific integrity of conservation-policy processes.
Political considerations delayed protection of the wolverine (upper left) in the United States (photo by U.S.
National and Park Service) and the shortnose sturgeon (lower right) in Canada (photo by U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service [USFWS]). The U.S. recovery plan for the Northern Spotted Owl (upper right) (photo by USFWS) was revised
to correct deficiencies identified in a review by 3 scientific societies. News of the rediscovery of the shrub Hibbertia
fumana (lower left) (photo by A. Orme) in Australia was delayed until a development at the site of rediscovery had
been permitted.
to Australian World Heritage areas in their 2016 report
on at-risk sites (Markham et al. 2016). Climate scientists
were also recently restricted from submitting comments
based on their results during public processes (Salleh &
Borschmann 2017).
Reforms to Safeguard the Scientific Integrity
of Outbound Communications
Institutionalize Protections via Scientific Integrity Policies
Publicity surrounding scientific integrity violations in the
United States led the Obama administration to issue a
Memorandum on Scientific Integrity that directed federal
agencies to develop policies that would strengthen safe-
guards on the integrity of the scientific process (Holdren
2010). Twenty-seven executive branch departments and
agencies developed policies to guide and protect the pro-
cess by which agencies use and publicly communicate
science, including use of nongovernmental scientists for
peer review and federal advisory committees. Many agen-
cies also put in place officials to oversee enforcement of
the policies. This system appears to work best when a
full-time scientific-integrity official reports to the high-
est ranking civil servant in the agency and the person
is close to agency science activities and removed from
political appointees. These new policies and continuing
pressure from the scientific community have resulted in a
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reduction in reported cases of inappropriate interfer-
ence in government decision-making processes (Gold-
man et al. 2015).
In Canada, the incoming Trudeau administration de-
clared that federal researchers could speak publicly about
research within their area of expertise without prior ap-
proval in most cases (Government of Canada 2016). The
government also established the new position of chief
science advisor, whose mandate includes safeguarding
scientific integrity and accelerating shifts toward more
transparent communication of federal scientific research
to the public.
To date, institutionalization of scientific integrity re-
forms in Australia has been more limited than in Canada
and the United States. Although several federal and
state institutions have issued statements committing the
organizations to a rigorous unbiased research process
(ARC 2015), their policies do not generally encom-
pass transparency in communication between agencies
and the public. In many agencies scientists still need
approval before they can speak publicly about their
research.
Strengthen Collective Bargaining Agreements
Although the adoption of the 2016 directive increased
public engagement by Canadian government scientists,
the new open-communication policies were not uni-
formly applied. Government scientists are employed un-
der different contracts, and protections varied widely
among agencies. In response, the union representing gov-
ernment scientists successfully negotiated for the con-
tractual right of scientists to speak publicly about their
research. Protections under this agreement will be dif-
ficult to reverse even if a future administration decides
to modify the communications directive. Although col-
lective bargaining agreements are an effective means of
insulating government scientists against loss of the right
to communicate their work, alternative methods exist
that strengthen such protections where such agreements
are not feasible.
When the Australian Labor party took power in 2007,
it promulgated charters for some public research orga-
nizations that sought to protect the right of scientists
to speak out and to ensure scientific publications pre-
sented information free from political interference (Price
2009). To address perceived shortcomings of the new
policy, Australia’s Community and Public Sector Union,
which represents staff at government research organiza-
tions, campaigned for a stronger Science Integrity Charter
based on several principles: open communication, dis-
semination, and internal and external debate of scientific
work; acknowledgment of the contestability of uncertain
science; and independence of public-sector institutions
and their staff (CSIRO Staff Association 2012). To our
knowledge, the proposed charter has not been imple-
mented to date.
Safeguard Public Access to Scientific Information
Open access to scientific information allows the public to
have confidence in conclusions from scientific research
and to engage as informed citizens in policy debates.
Administrations vary in their commitment to public ac-
cess to scientific information produced by government
agencies. During the Obama administration, public ac-
cess to scientific information was expanded via new
scientific-integrity policies and new statutes. The FOIA
(Freedom of Information Act) Improvement Act of 2016
increased public access to government scientific docu-
ments and communications, and the Whistleblower Pro-
tection Enhancement Act (WPEA) of 2012 increased pro-
tections for federal scientists who expose censorship of
scientific and technical information. Similarly, the 2016
Directive on the Management of Communications com-
mitted the Canadian Government to principles of open
government including access to data. In Australia, some
state governments (e.g., New South Wales) have publicly
committed to transparency and open access to data (NSW
OEH 2016).
Despite new protections enacted in the United States,
dismissal of the scientific underpinnings regarding cli-
mate change byDonald Trumphas raised fears that public
access to government climate data and other scientific
data will be curtailed. In response, scientists at several
major universities developed tools and organized data-
rescue events to rapidly archive government scientific
data on nongovernmental servers to ensure continued
public access (Holthaus 2016). Although efforts such
as DataRefuge (http://www.ppehlab.org/) provide a de-
fense against loss of public access to government data,
they are not a substitute for stronger institutional safe-
guards that would mandate continued access and collec-
tion of new data.
Bias and Lack of Transparency in Considering
Input from Nongovernmental Scientists
Informed debate and provision of robust scientific evi-
dence for decision making requires comprehensive ac-
cess to available science, much of which is not done by
government scientists. The extent to which and ways in
which science produced by nongovernmental scientists
informs conservation policy decisions differs among the
3 nations. Consequently, reforms necessary to ensure
that independent scientific input is solicited and con-
sidered without political bias also differ. Environmental
statutes in the United States contain extensive require-
ments for science-based decisions. For example, the U.S.
Endangered Species Act (ESA) (16 U.S.C. §1532 4(a)(1))
requires listing and delisting decisions for certain species
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be based solely on scientific data (Doremus 2004), and
agency policy requires external scientific peer review
of draft decisions to ensure scientific integrity. The U.S.
courts play a prominent role in adjudicating policy dis-
putes, and litigation often hinges on whether an ad-
ministrative agency’s decision follows from the available
science.
In Canada and Australia, few statutes require inde-
pendent scientific input into conservation policy, aside
from the public-comment period. However, the Canadian
Species at Risk Act formalizes the role of an independent
scientific advisory body (Committee on the Status of En-
dangered Wildlife [COSEWIC]) to assess species at risk.
The committee conducts independent scientific reviews
on the status of species at risk and makes the results
publicly available, whether decisions support or reject
listing (Hutchings et al. 2017).
Much authority for conservation policy, especially in
Canada and Australia, resides at the state and provincial
rather than the federal level, and the role of science in
policy often differs between the 2 levels. For example, in
New South Wales, Australia, listing of threatened species
and ecosystems is decided by an independent scientific
committee, whereas at the federal level, although an anal-
ogous committee exists, its recommendations must be
approved by theminister for the environment (Nicholson
et al. 2015).
To illustrate key reforms to protect the integrity of inde-
pendent scientific input into policy, we examined several
recent agency decisions related to the ESA, the main
statute designed to protect biodiversity in the United
States (Fig. 1). We considered the ESA because it con-
tains clear requirements that policy makers incorporate
independent scientific input, yet 73% of staff survey re-
spondents at the U.S. Fish andWildlife Service (FWS), one
of 2 agencies that implement the ESA, thought improper
political pressure remained too high despite the ESA’s
science mandates (Goldman et al. 2015). We linked our
suggested reforms to examples fromCanada and Australia
where possible.
Reforms to Safeguard the Scientific Integrity of
Inbound Communications
Broaden the Scope of Information Solicited from
Independent Scientists
Agencies are constantly faced with the policy question,
should we act? This initial decision is often heavily influ-
enced by an agency’s scientific evaluation of the facts.
However, in many agencies only the decision to take
proactive action is subject to peer review. For example,
the ESA requires 2 federal agencies (FWS and the Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service) to make determinations
about adding or removing species from the law’s lists
of protected species. Currently, external peer review of
decisions to list a species as endangered or threatened is
required but external review is not required for decisions
not to list a species.
The wolverine (Gulo gulo), a mid-sized carnivore,
is threatened by loss of snow-covered denning habitat
(Fig. 1). Although FWS scientists concluded that threats to
the wolverine from climate change qualified the species
for listing as threatened, FWS leadership overruled these
conclusions and declined to list the wolverine. A federal
court subsequently concluded that the decision to deny
protections was not consistent with the best available sci-
ence and was likely due to “immense political pressure”
by states that opposed listing (Defenders of Wildlife v.
Jewell, U.S. District Court for the District of Montana,
CV 14-246-M-DLC. 2016). If regulations had required the
decision not to list to be subject to review by nongovern-
mental experts, litigation might not have been necessary.
Although increasing the number of decisions requiring
outside peer reviewwill result in increased time and costs
for the agency, these may be offset by more robust con-
servation outcomes and less litigation. However, previous
informal peer reviews of the FWS scientists’ conclusion
in favor of listing showed that their conclusion was scien-
tifically sound, but these reviews were ignored by agency
leadership. When the political and economic stakes are
high concerning listing of a species, litigation may be
difficult to avoid, at least in the United States.
Even in Canada, where scientific advice is required
to inform both positive and negative listing decisions,
political actions can constrain the role of scientific advice
in the process. AlthoughCOSEWIC assessments are based
solely on evidence, species receive no formal protection
until the relevant minister submits the species-at-risk files
to the prime minister’s cabinet for final approval and the
consultation process concludes (Hutchings et al. 2017).
This legislative loophole allows for politically motivated
delays. Under the Harper administration, the minister of
the environment ceased transmitting COSEWIC advice to
the cabinet to delay protection of as many as 198 species,
subspecies, and distinct populations in Canada, including
the shortnose sturgeon (Acipenser brevirostrum) (Noe¨l
2016) (Fig. 1).
Agencies also often seek to narrowly define the sci-
entific questions presented to peer reviewers to insulate
controversial scientific determinations from review. For
example, the scope of peer review of Klamath Basin
(U.S.A.) water policies by the National Academy of Sci-
ences and National Research Council was manipulated
by direction from Vice President Cheney (Fein 2011).
Another example is the review of the proposed delist-
ing determination for the gray wolf (Canis lupus), for
which reviewers were directed to focus solely on tax-
onomic issues, rather than consider the full spectrum
of scientific questions on available habitat and other
topics relevant to the analysis required under the ESA
(FWS 2013).
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Ensure a Diversity of Independent Scientific Input with
Transparency Regarding Conflicts of Interest
Selection of peer reviewers by agencies and contractors
remains vulnerable to political interference. The FWS of-
ten specifies in the statement of work for peer review
that prior “advocacy” disqualifies scientists from serv-
ing as peer reviewers (FWS 2013). This clause has been
used to exclude scientists who interpret their science
for the broader public or comment during a regulatory
comment period. Because scientists who have taken posi-
tions supportive of agency policy are typically not consid-
ered advocates, this screening process may lend bias to
reviews.
Political screening processes may subvert the effective-
ness of legislation intended to protect declining species.
Prior to 2009, COSEWIC recommendations to the Min-
istry of the Environment for expert appointments were
routinely accepted. Under the Harper administration,
there were concerns over potential political interference
after scientists who had publicly commented on con-
servation issues were denied renewal of their COSEWIC
appointments (Noe¨l 2016). In 2013, negative coverage
of the exclusion of key experts from the peer review of
national wolf delisting forced the FWS to suspend the
initial contractor-led scientific peer review and commis-
sion a more independent review by the National Center
for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis (Morell 2014). The
review by a panel of experts (which included scientists
previously excluded from the review) concluded that the
proposal was not based on the best available evidence
(Morell 2014).
No-advocate reviewer selection policies, where they
still exist, should be reformed to reflect peer review
policies that explicitly value a diversity of independent
and qualified scientific perspectives. The U.S. Office of
Management and Budget has such a policy stating that
“[o]n most controversial issues, there exists a range of
respected scientific viewpoints regarding interpretation
of the available literature. Inviting reviewers with com-
peting views on the science may lead to a sharper, more
focused peer review. Indeed, as a final layer of review,
some organizations (e.g., the US National Academy of
Sciences [NAS]) specifically recruit reviewerswith strong
opinions to test the scientific strength and balance of
their reports” (OMB 2002).
Another problematic aspect of current U.S. agency
peer-review policies involves undisclosed conflicts of in-
terest by the large corporate contractors frequently used
to manage the peer-review process. Although this ap-
proach gives the appearance of providing an arms-length
separation between the agency and peer reviewers, the
reality is often different. Conflict of interest may result in
biased selection of peer reviewers and a biased summary
of peer reviews being provided by the contractor. Con-
flicts of interestmay arisewhen the same corporation also
performs services for entities that have a vested interest
in the policy under review (Goldman et al. 2015). For
example, a consulting firm that has managed hundreds of
government peer reviews for toxicological assessments
of chemicals also frequently conducts reviews for the
chemical industry and has been criticized for relying on
a small circle of experts with industry ties as reviewers
(Adams & Song 2014). Although the FWS has recently
taken steps to document conflicts of interest by individ-
ual peer reviewers (FWS 2016), the new policy does not
ensure transparency concerning conflict of interest by
the contractors themselves.
A key difference between scientific-journals peer re-
view and scientific review that occurs as part of regula-
tory decision making is the absence in the latter of an
independent editor or arbiter who decides whether the
agency has adequately addressed shortcomings identified
by reviewers (Greenwald et al. 2012). Agency peer re-
view, especially for highly controversial decisions, could
benefit from an additional round in which an arbiter or
the peer reviewers themselves evaluate the adequacy of
the agency’s response to reviewer concerns.Without this
process, the only recourse to address an improper deci-
sion is a legal challenge. At a minimum, agencies should
be required to produce a detailed statement resembling
the response to reviewers required by scientific journals,
rather than a general response to public comments as
required under current policies.
Strengthening Societal Support for Scientific
Integrity
Although the reformswe suggest provide procedural safe-
guards, the most important factor in protecting scientific
integrity may be consistent support from agency leaders
and other political appointees. A key lesson from the
Canadian experience is that undermining scientific in-
tegrity creates a cultural change in public service that
is only slowly undone, even after formal policy reform.
To institutionalize a culture of scientific integrity, agency
leaders should be appointedwho have solid track records
of supporting determinations made by scientists in the
face of political pressure. Policies designed to ensure
agency scientists are insulated from political pressure
should be compared among agencies and best prac-
tices adopted more uniformly across agencies in or-
der to implement a structure and culture that supports
independent science (Lowell & Kelly 2016). Agency cul-
ture should encourage and reward government scien-
tists when they publish policy-relevant research in peer-
reviewed science journals, speak publicly about scientific
findings, present at scientific conferences, and partic-
ipate in professional scientific societies. Finally, those
holding key leadership positions in agencies making reg-
ulatory policy based in significant part on science should
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be required to have a minimum background in a relevant
scientific discipline.
Scientific societies can play a valuable public service
by performing independent scientific reviews of draft
agency decisions. For example, 3 U.S. scientific soci-
eties reviewed the recovery plan for the Northern Spot-
ted Owl (Strix occidentalis caurina) and identified ma-
jor deficiencies. Their conclusions led the subsequent
administration to substantially revise the recovery plan
(SCB 2008) (Fig. 1). Agencies should engage independent
nonprofit scientific organizations to oversee the peer re-
view process to increase the independence of the pro-
cess from political pressure. Such organizations include
academic institutes, universities, and scientific societies
in the relevant fields. Agencies should invite reviews
from scientific societies even in cases where the primary
review is done elsewhere, rather than simply passively
accepting such input as part of the public-comment pro-
cess. Agencies should also consider soliciting advice from
nongovernmental scientists in cooperation with relevant
scientific societies to help strengthen scientific integrity
policies.
In turn, scientific societies should work to increase
engagement in the policy process by the scientific com-
munity. For example, scientific societies should encour-
age their members to contribute their expertise dur-
ing public-comment periods required for agency rule
making. Such public participation by scientists, if prop-
erly framed, does not negatively affect their credibil-
ity (Kotcher et al. 2017). There are complementary
roles for scientific societies, public-sector unions, and
other nongovernmental organizations (e.g., the Union
of Concerned Scientists and Evidence for Democracy in
the United States and Canada, respectively), and some
roles will be more appropriately filled by the latter
groups than by scientific societies. Establishing mecha-
nisms through which government scientists can securely
share information with NGOs and journalists can help
the latter organizations publicize and contest integrity
abuses.
Scientific societies can also assist in building public
support for the use of evidence in decision making,
via coalitions between scientific societies in many dis-
ciplines and other nongovernmental organizations. The
most prominent recent example is the global March for
Science, which involved over 100 scientific organizations
in over 600 events designed to defend scientific integrity
and increase awareness of positive role of science in so-
ciety (Wessel 2017). Given recent trends toward politi-
cization of science around issues such as climate change,
scientists have a civic responsibility to engage with the
wider public to affirm that science is a crucial resource
for developing evidence-based policy and regulations that
are in the public interest (McCright & Dunlap 2011;
Garrard et al. 2016).
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